We look forward to welcoming you to the LSE campus next week. For those who are unfamiliar with this area, please visit http://www2.lse.ac.uk/mapsAndDirections/Home.aspx for maps and directions of how to reach the Old Building, LSE. Once at the Old Building reception, please either take the lift or stairs to the sixth floor and follow signs to the Shaw Library.
Thank you for registering to attend all/part of this event. Registration is now closed, with all places filled so please do contact Rebecca Lumb (r.c.lumb@lse.ac.uk) if, for any reason, you now find you are unable to attend.
We look forward to welcoming you to the LSE campus next week. For those who are unfamiliar with this area, please visit http://www2.lse.ac.uk/mapsAndDirections/Home.aspx for maps and directions of how to reach the Old Building, LSE. Once at the Old Building reception, please either take the lift or stairs to the sixth floor and follow signs to the Shaw Library.
Please ensure you arrive well in advance of the start time of your selected session/s, to allow for registration. Registration times are as follows:
• All-day delegates and Flip Klijn session attendees should register from 9.30am
• Lars Ehlers session attendees should register from 11.15am
• David Manlove session attendees should register from 12.00pm
• Afternoon delegates and Aytek Erdil session attendees should register from 1.45pm
• Sophie Bade session attendees should register from 2.30pm
• Alvin Roth session attendees should register from 3.55pm
In the interests of sustainability, we will not be providing delegates with printed copies of the event programme. In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferredacceptance (DA-)mechanism with responsive strict priorities performs well and economists have successfully implemented DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in such environments--including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms--satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB) procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation for MTB-DAmechanisms that are used in New York City.
(Joint work with Bettina Klaus.)
12:15 David Manlove (Glasgow) "Junior Doctor Allocation and Kidney Exchange: Theory and Practice" Abstract: Matching problems typically involve assigning agents to commodities, possibly on the basis of ordinal preferences or other metrics. These problems have large-scale applications to centralised clearinghouses in many countries and contexts. Moreover, these problems have received much exposure in recent months due to the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley.
In this talk I will describe the matching problems featuring in two centralised clearinghouses in the UK that have involved collaborations between the National Health Service and the University of Glasgow. One of these deals with the allocation of junior doctors to Scottish hospitals, and the other is concerned with finding kidney exchanges among incompatible donor-patient pairs across the UK.
In each case I will describe the applications, briefly outline the theoretical underlying problems, discuss the algorithmic techniques for their solution, and give an overview of results arising from real data connected with the matching schemes in recent years.
(Joint work with Rob Irving and Gregg O'Malley.) 3 | P a g e 13:00-14:00 lunch (buffet at the Shaw Library)
14:00 Aytek Erdil (Cambridge) "Prioritizing Diversity in School Choice" Abstract: Promoting diversity in schools has recently emerged as an important policy goal. Typically school choice programs take into account student preferences and allocate scarce schools on the basis of priorities, using stability as the solution concept. Therefore a notion of prioritizing diversity is essential. We introduce a rich class of priorities which capture intuitive notions of diversity. Substitutable priorities with ties not only ensure existence of stable assignments, but also allow students of same types to be treated equally. Moreover we describe an algorithm which finds an optimal stable assignment.
(Joint work with Taro Kumano.)
14:45 Sophie Bade (Royal Holloway) "Pareto Optimal, Strategy Proof, Non-Bossy and Anonymous Random Matching Mechanisms" Abstract: Take any Pareto optimal, strategy proof and non-bossy matching mechanism for a housing problem. Define a uniform randomization over this mechanism by drawing the assignment of agents to the roles in the mechanism from a uniform distribution over all possible such assignments. I show that any such uniform randomization is equivalent to random serial dictatorship. According to random serial dictatorship the probability of a matching is calculated as the fraction of all orders of dictators according to which said matching arises divided by the grand set of all possible orders of dictators. This extends the Abdulkadiroglu and Soenmez' (1998) celebrated equivalence result between the uniform randomization over Gale's top trading cycles mechanism and random serial dictatorship to the entire set of all Pareto optimal, strategy proof and non-bossy matching mechanisms. This workshop is part of an ESRC sponsored series of one-day workshops. These events at LSE are organised by Olivier Gossner and Bernhard von Stengel.
